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Abstract  
While a relativist view of environmental ethics could be quite difficult to justify, it is also 
difficult to be so strict about the quest for global environmental justice1. At the same time, even 
though the reality of environmental degradation is plain to see, most African traditional 
communities and even their respective states at large still wallow in poverty such that they are 
still in need of developing themselves if they are to reach the level of development in the 
developed countries in the global North. Moreso, the majority of indigenous and mostly poor 
and underrepresented African people in the global South are faced with disproportionate 
amount of environmental benefits and burdens compared to their counterparts in the global 
North. In this article, I therefore seek to examine a normative framework for conceptualising 
global environmental justice within different environmental, social, political and economic 
contexts. I consider how best environmental benefits and burdens could be fairly distributed 
across communities with different environmental, social, political and economic advantages. 
In the end, I appeal to John Rawls’s conception of distributive justice as a framework for 
arriving at an acceptable view of global environmental justice that takes into account the 
circumstances of the global South.    
Introduction 
The question of how to equitably share or distribute the benefits and burdens of environmental 
or climate change remains unresolved in much of contemporary environmental ethical 
thinking. This problem borders on the central question of justice in society which according to 
John Rawls; “justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” 
(Rawls, 1971: 3). Similarly, global environmental justice must be a fundamental virtue for our 
contemporary global society. Yet “environmental practices and policies affect different groups 
of people differently, and environmental benefits and burdens are often distributed in ways that 
                                                            
1 By global environmental justice, I mean the general global concerns to do with environmental justice issues such 
as how to equitably distribute and mitigate environmental benefits and burdens respectively across the entire 
world. This is why I will always be using the terms environmental justice and global environmental justice 
interchangeably.   
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are unjust” (Figueroa and Mills, 2001: 426). Considering that presently the world is not 
homogeneous in terms of social, political and economic status and development, it is not 
surprising that the less developed and poor African communities in the global South2 still need 
to make use of the Earth’s natural environment in order for them to reach the kind of 
development which other industrialised economies in the global North have reached. At the 
same time, it is difficult to justify such kind of envisaged development if it has a negative 
impact on the environment and ultimately against the notion of global environmental justice as 
it is understood from what I see as a Western philosophical perspective and conception of 
global environmental justice. This view challenges humanity to search for a universally 
acceptable view of distributive environmental justice because of the understanding that 
environmental burdens transcend national boundaries (Figueroa and Mills, 2001: 427). 
Accordingly, I try to reach for a universally acceptable view of global environmental justice 
that takes into account the circumstances of the global South by appealing to a distributive 
framework of justice notwithstanding its challenges in terms of applicability at a global scale.     
Central to the issues around the possibility of distributing environmental justice is the debate 
on whether developing countries such as those in the greater part of sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. in 
the global South) ought to have duties and responsibilities towards climate change mitigation 
and attaining global environmental justice while at the same time in need of industrialising 
themselves and developing their poor economies. This is why Alexander Gajevic Sayegh 
argues that, “the idea that developing nations should not have duties to mitigate climate change 
is being progressively abandoned. Yet, the question of how to share the burdens of climate 
change mitigation is still unresolved” (Sayegh, 2018: 344). I venture into this debate with the 
intention to revisit the generally accepted universal conception of global environmental justice 
that seeks to mistakenly understand the economies in the global North and those in the global 
South as if they are at the same original position. I use the phrase ‘original position’, in the 
sense in which it is used by Rawls to refer to “the appropriate initial status quo which insures 
that the fundamental agreements area reached [in the quest for justice] are fair” (Rawls, 1971: 
15). Against this background, I therefore consider how environmental justice issues ought to 
be understood and distributed differently in societies that have had different social, political 
and economic opportunities.       
                                                            
2 By global South, I refer to the less developed regions and countries, mostly in Africa, Latin America and some 
developing countries in Asia. However, in this work, my use of the global South is more nuanced on the less 
developed and developing regions and countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Recently there has been a considerable body of literature on African environmental ethics. (See 
for example, Tangwa (2004), Murove (2004; 2009), Horsthemke (2015), Ikuenobe (2014), 
Chemhuru (2016; 2018). However, the area of environmental politics concerned with the ideas 
surrounding environmental justice on marginalised, poor and black communities has not 
received much attention from environmental ethicists working in the area of environmental 
ethics. (See also: Bullard, 1990: 2). In this article, I try to search for a normative framework on 
which to appeal for the quest for a reasonable conception of global environmental justice for 
Africa while at the same time considering the need for development in the less developed 
economies like most African communities in the global South. I address the central question 
of whether the developing world (much of Africa) should be allowed to make use of the 
environment (e.g: pollute) in order to develop themselves to the levels where other developed 
countries are. This could perhaps satisfy John Rawls’ idea and conception of justice as fairness 
in the traditional conception of the social contract (Rawls, 1971: 3).     
It is a fact that the notion of environmental justice is a twentieth century movement emanating 
mainly from the global North. At the same time, African environmental ethics has mostly 
gathered momentum in the twenty-first century and that it has also not addressed the concerns 
for global environmental justice. I therefore suggest how duties, obligations and responsibility 
for global environmental justice issues ought to be understood by first appreciating the binary 
distinctions between the global North and the global South.  
First I examine my starting point for my working understanding of environmental justice. In 
this section, I trace the background from which the notion of global environmental justice is 
coming from. After that, I consider the problems in the contemporary clarion calls and 
approaches to global environmental justice by focussing on the dilemma which developing 
countries in the global South face. Lastly, I consider an alternative normative framework for 
conceptualising a sound conception of environmental justice. Overall, as I consider and reflect 
on the paradox of environmental justice in the global South by focusing on the African context, 
I take Rawls view that “a theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised 
if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well arranged must be 
reformed or abolished if they are unjust” (Rawls, 1971: 3). This is the position with which I 
have in mind as I analyse the plausibility of a conception of distributive environmental justice 
in Africa that is based on looking at economic systems as elementary to the attainment of justice 
as fairness (See Rawls, 1971: 234).     
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Global Environmental Justice in Perspective    
The movements that have represented the debates concerning the quest for global 
environmental justice are quite complex. In the United States of America, the term 
environmental justice became popular when it was used by activists and lobbyists with 
reference to their protests against waste dumping in North Carolina in 1982 (Bullard, 1990: 
30). Activist scholar, Robert Bullard popularised the movement with the publication of his 
(1990) book, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class and Environmental Quality which focuses on 
social and political issues around environmental justice. As I consider some of these aspects, I 
seek to conceptualise a plausible view of environmental justice for sub-Saharan African 
communities, most of which are still poor and underdeveloped. I will work within the context 
of a distributive justice perspective to global environmental justice.  
The notion of distributing environmental justice must be understood first as a global concern 
reacting to unpersuasive global environmental practices and policies that support inequitable 
distribution of environmental benefits and burdens. Environmental justice is a global concern 
in the sense that problems about the inequitable distribution and inequalities pertaining to 
environmental or natural resources are widespread. According to Figueroa and Mills, 
 the response to inequalities in the distribution of environmental burdens in nearly 
every nation around the world, and the failure of mainstream environmental groups 
and agencies to address the issues of inequitable distribution and representation, 
has culminated in the latest social movement addressing environmental issues – the 
environmental justice movement (Figueroa and Mills, 2001: 428). 
A similar view is also expressed by Jedediah Purdy as he argues that mainstream environmental 
laws pay “little attention to the distributive effects of environmental policy” (Purdy, 2018: 809). 
At the same time, the threat of environmental deterioration and its impact on both humanity 
and nature itself are being felt by all human beings despite one’s geographic, social, political 
and economic position. All these factors have therefore culminated in the growth and 
development of central issues to do with environmental justice concerns.       
Although the notion and discourse of global environmental justice is mainly being influenced 
by the threat to the natural environment through pollution, climate change, global warming, 
etc, the quest for environmental justice also ought to be understood as an important ingredient 
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of the quest for global justice and ultimately, globalisation3. This is because global 
environmental justice is concerned with looking at the whole environment as a global entity 
that is in serious need of everyone’s attention, care and concern. For this reason, the natural 
environment therefore becomes a rallying-point for global justice issues and the ultimate quest 
for globalisation because human beings across the globe interact differently with the natural 
environment and consequently, affect others in different ways. According to Bill Lawson; 
environmental justice, at least, entails preserving the environment as a global 
entity, but also making those persons who feel, have felt, have been, or are victims 
of environmental crimes and atrocities feel as if they are part of the solution as full 
members of the human community and not just the environmental dumping ground 
for the well-off (Lawson, 2008: 1). 
Yet globalisation and global justice still remain some of the strongly contested notions in the 
world.    
Notwithstanding the contestations around the understanding of globalisation, global justice and 
environmental justice, I will take one of the universally accepted and elaborate views of the 
notion of environmental justice that is given by the Environmental Protection Agency in 
America as follows:  
Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all 
people regardless of race, color, national origin, culture, education, or income with 
respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental 
laws, regulations, and policies. Fair Treatment means that no group of people, 
including racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic groups, should bear a disproportionate 
share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, 
municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, local, and 
tribal environmental programs and policies. Meaningful Involvement means that: 
(1) potentially affected community residents have an appropriate opportunity to 
participate in decisions about a proposed activity that will affect their environment 
and/or health; (2) the public’s contribution can influence the regulatory agency’s 
decision; (3) the concerns of all participants involved will be considered in the 
decision-making process; and (4) the decision makers seek out and facilitate the 
involvement of those potentially affected (EPA, 2008) 
                                                            
3 The issues around the notion of global justice and globalisation are quite complex and diverse. I will not 
venture into these issues as I am particularly focussed on environmental justice.  
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While this view has generally been taken and accepted by most environmentalists the world 
over, as the universal understanding of environmental justice, on the contrary, it is quite 
difficult to meaningfully conceptualise a smooth and thoroughgoing global view of 
environmental justice in the world because of various factors to do with levels of human 
development, poverty, race, class, gender and among others. 
The question of distributing environmental justice is closely related and connected to issues to 
do with racism, sexism, classism, and poverty, all of which cannot be easily settled. For 
example, among Afro-American black communities in America, Robert Bullard observes that 
“a growing number of African American grassroots activists have challenged public policies 
and industrial practices that threaten the residential integrity of their neighbourhoods” (Bullard, 
1990: XVI). In most African communities, considering that issues to do with race, class, gender 
and poverty are still unresolved, it is quite difficult to meaningfully conceptualise a view 
environmental justice that is comparable to other non-African communities in different 
circumstances. For example, except for Zimbabwe and a few African countries, colonial land 
imbalances mainly based on race, class and gender still exist in most post-colonial African 
countries. A case in point is the current call by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) 
for the compulsory acquisition of land without compensation in South Africa. This explains 
why in a posthumous publication in 2008, Simon Mawondo argues that in most African 
countries, we have a model reconciliation without justice in reference to the land question 
(Mawondo, 2008: 10).    
From the above view, therefore, it is clear that as long as our societies continue to accept 
environmental policies and philosophies that promote racism, classism, and poverty, then, it 
would be very difficult to conceptualise and realise a meaningful view of distributive 
environmental justice. For example, according to Figueroa, “concerns for the distributive 
dimension of environmental justice begin with the observation that people of color, the poor, 
and under-represented groups such as indigenous tribes and nations are faced with a 
disproportionate amount of environmental burdens” (Figueroa and Mills, 2001: 427). 
Similarly, the poor and less developed countries in Africa contribute less towards 
environmental damage through pollution compared to their counterparts in the heavily 
industrialised countries in the global North. Yet these poor and underdeveloped communities 
in Africa bear more of these environmental burdens and at the same time expected to conform 
to global environmental policies. (See also Kelbessa, 2015: 45). In what follows, I seek to 
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highlight some of the dilemmas that the African community face in light of the discourse of 
global environmental justice.       
Conceptualising Global Environmental Justice: Africa’s Dilemma 
World economies can easily be ranked according to three major categories; i.e.: the developed 
or first word countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden), the 
newly developed countries (Brazil, China, India) and the developing countries (the majority of 
sub-Saharan African countries, perhaps with the exception of South Africa which exhibits the 
characteristics of both a developed and a developing country). In this work however, I will 
bracket all the sub-Saharan African countries as belonging to the category of developing 
countries in the global South despite notable differences in terms of economic development in 
these African countries.    
Despite the above categorisation of world economies according to both geographical and 
economic categories, some of the most unifying problems that are threatening the world are 
environmental degradation and climate change. These problems are being necessitated by 
pollution through the emission of various toxic substances and emissions into water bodies and 
the atmosphere. These problems have culminated in the world economies in both the global 
North and South uniting to fight this phenomenon from a common front by advocating for 
environmental justice because “climate action is no longer marked by a sharp binary north-
south division” (Sayegh, 2018: 344). This is so because the effects of such climate change 
through floods, droughts, global warming, and emergence of new diseases like cancer are now 
plain to see. However, the most affected populations remain the poor, disadvantaged and 
minority communities mostly in Africa and the global South at large. (See also, Minority Rights 
Group International, 2008: 1). Rawls refers to these problems as some of the problems of a 
political economy (Rawls, 1971: 234). In that sense, I therefore submit that a sound theory of 
global environmental justice must take into account the economic disparities between the North 
and the South.          
 In addition, it is also striking to note that the largest emitters are the developed countries and 
the newly developed economies in the global North respectively (See also, Sayegh, 2018: 345). 
At the same time, developing countries contribute insignificant levels of these emissions 
because of lower levels of industrialisation and development. As a result, it is now evident that 
almost one-fifth of the world’s human population consumes almost four-fifths of the world’s 
natural resources, leaving about four-fifths of the world’s population with about a fifth of the 
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world’s natural resources (Figueroa and Mills, 2001: 426). In the end, those who consume more 
of the world’s natural resources also produce more in terms of effluent. The effect of this 
disparity is mainly felt by the less developed or developing countries that are at the receiving 
end of much of the effects of climate change. Accordingly, Kelbessa argues that “although 
climate change affects all countries, the world’s poorest countries face the most severe impact. 
It is the wealthy who are using most of the energy that leads to the emissions that cause climate 
change, while it is the poor who will bear most of the costs” (Kelbessa, 2015: 45). Despite this 
disparity in terms of contribution to environmental pollution and climate change, the quest for 
environmental justice demands that all countries consider equal obligations and responsibilities 
towards the attainment of environmental justice. Yet African countries still need to consider 
weighing the benefits and burdens of human and economic development against the quest for 
environmental justice.    
The disparities in the enjoyment of nature’s benefits and burdens, as well as the urgent calls 
for environmental responsibility naturally invites us to the question of whether there is fairness 
in such use of the world’s natural resources and the resultant emissions of pollutants into the 
atmosphere. Although Bullard is more focussed on the black American communities in North 
America, he makes an important observation about the injustice that is mostly experienced by 
the less privileged and poor communities across the world. According to Bullard, “an 
abundance of documentation shows blacks, lower-income groups, and working-class persons 
are subjected to a disproportionately large amount of pollution and other environmental 
stressors in their neighbourhoods as well as in their work places” (Bullard, 1990: 1). This 
explains why in both developed and developing countries, mining, industrial and dumping cites 
are mostly located close to marginalised and poor communities while they do not benefit from 
any of these activities. In Zimbabwe for example, when diamonds were discovered in the 
Marange area in Manicaland province after the turn of the new millennium, the local 
communities in the Marange area were displaced and relocated to the periphery of these mining 
fields while they continued to endure poverty, displacement, pollution and disproportionate 
amounts of environmental benefits from these mining activities.       
The irony of the idea of environmental justice in the world is also when it is approached and 
used like a prescription from the developed world to the emerging and developing countries 
whose communities are still poor. In most cases, the discourse on the need for environmental 
justice also seems to be mainly coming from the worst emitters in the world who have also 
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developed their economies before the emerging or developing countries in the global South. 
Accordingly, Figueroa and Mills argue that, 
the poor and developing nations around the world (primarily in the global South) 
attempt to satisfy their rights to development as the rich, industrialised nations 
(primarily in the global North) call for environmental protection against the same 
development practices that they themselves invented and used for decades and 
which introduced much of the environmental degradation we see around the world 
today (Figueroa and Mills, 2001: 426). 
What is paradoxical here is the universal quest for fairness concerning the use of nature’s 
natural resources and the need for the equal avoidance of environmental degradation by both 
the developing and developed countries without taking into consideration the disparities in the 
levels of human and economic development in the global South and the global North. 
Also, within the developing world, and in particular Africa, environmental injustice has 
actually been committed not by these African countries themselves, but mostly by the majority 
of those in the developed European countries through colonialism. Ikuenobe comes close to 
this view as he argues that, “one motivation for Europeans in the colonisation of Africa was 
the need to get raw materials for their industries and the need to get markets for the products 
of their industries” (Ukuenobe, 2014: 12). Colonialism has thus been largely responsible for 
environmental degradation and environmental injustice in Africa because it has contributed to 
environmental disparities between the North and the South through the plunder of natural 
resources in Africa as well as Africa’s traditional value systems that are aimed at safeguarding 
sound environmental ethical thinking. Ikuenobe intimates that “many of these traditional 
African values, ways of life, and the moral attitudes of conservation were destroyed by the 
exploitative ethos of European colonialism and modernity” (Ekuenobe, 2014: 2). This explains 
why Ikuenobe comes to the conclusion that “colonial structures have created for Africa very 
interesting problems that have a bearing on the current environmental problems in Africa” 
(Ikuenobe, 2014: 13).  
Also to confirm the view that colonialism has not ended with the attainment of political 
independence in Africa (See, Nkrumah, 1965), today several transnational corporations 
continue to exploit Africa’s vast mineral and other natural resources which they use to 
industrialise and grow their own economies in the global North. This explains why for example, 
“the most industrialised nations of the world have produced enough CFCs to generate 
dangerous holes in the ozone layer of the atmosphere, with deleterious effects on the health of 
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the entire world’s plant, animal, and human population” (Figueroa and Mills, 2001: 426). Yet 
paradoxically, these industrialised nations are in the forefront of preaching the gospel of 
environmental justice.       
From the above view, it therefore becomes very difficult to talk of, and even envisage a 
universally accepted view of environmental justice in a world that is not socially, politically 
and economically homogenous. The attainment of environmental justice remains elusive unless 
gender, class, racial, social, political and economic divisions and inequalities that currently 
characterise the world are resolved. Lawson avers that “the problem is the bringing together of 
diverse environmental stakeholders to resolve issues regarding the environment. This is 
particularly difficult when environmental policies appear to be rooted in class or race divisions” 
(Lawson, 2008: 2). This view is even complicated most especially when one considers that 
women, people of colour, the poor and the less developed nations in the global South have 
mostly endured the burdens of environmental damage and policies that have benefitted mostly 
those in the global North. 
As a result, because of the history of racism, oppression and poverty in Africa, such 
communities who should be on the forefront in terms of promoting environmental justice in 
order to have a liveable environment, continue to remain indifferent to the discourse of 
environmental justice. Although Lawson is not more focussed on communities in Africa per 
se, he identifies this attitude among African Americans in America as he argues that, “African 
Americans who should be anxious to join environmental coalitions are often reluctant to join 
with mainstream groups pushing for global action regarding the environment. This reluctance 
often leads mainstream environmentalists to argue that this group is uncaring when it comes to 
the global environment” (Lawson, 2008: 2). This reluctance could be explained by looking at 
the history of racism, oppression, and poverty which African communities in the global South 
attribute to the well-off who are now in the forefront of championing environmental justice. 
However, what is important is to realise that environmental problems like global warming, heat 
waves, climate change and extinction of species impact on all human beings and therefore it is 
urgent that all human beings equally contribute to, and derive sound environmental policies 
like the quest for global environmental justice. It is also important to note that the call for global 
environmental justice is premised on the understanding that; 
environmental concerns are not like racism or sexism, which may affect a particular 
group of people, environmental concerns impact on us all and thus should be the 
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concern of us all. This means that as members of the human family we have a 
vested interest in good environmental policy and a clean planet (Lawson, 2008: 2). 
Accordingly, the argument against the quest for global environmental justice on the basis of 
either race or class structures could be misplaced. It is in the best interest of all humanity 
regardless of sex, colour, race or nationality to be meaningfully involved in coming up with 
policies that derive environmental justice and the equitable distribution of environmental 
benefits and burdens.        
The land question also raises problems with regards to the distributive approaches to 
environmental justice in Africa. Like I have already argued, except for Zimbabwe which at the 
turn of the new millennium embarked on a compulsory program of redistributing the land, most 
of the land in post-colonial African states still belongs to the minority non-indigenous settle 
communities. In essence, the appeals to private property rights and human rights in post-
colonial Africa is often used in order to pacify indigenous populations from claiming back their 
land. This is why for example, Erasmus Masitera argues that in Zimbabwe, “questions 
concerning ownership and property rights, the benefits for the community (social justice), 
justice and equality among others dominated discussions and narratives connected to 
Zimbabwean land exchanges” (Masitera, 2016: 21).  
Also, across the better part of post-colonial Africa, indigenous African communities are still 
struggling to get back their land, or receive just compensation from their erstwhile colonisers 
for the land that was taken away from them. Yet these communities are expected to conform 
to environmental policies supporting the quest for environmental justice. Although he is more 
focussed on Zimbabwe’s land issue, Masitera identifies land appropriation in Africa with 
“deprivation, displacement, marginalisation and discrimination” (Masitera, 2016: 21). In fact, 
in most of these African communities, the majority of indigenous black Africa people do not 
have access to the most basic natural resource, land. So, in that regard, it also becomes absurd 
to talk of environmental justice where there is social injustice with regards to the distribution 
of natural resources like the land.   
Distributing Environmental Benefits and Burdens 
So far an acceptable view of distributive environmental justice seems difficult to arrive at if 
one considers the complex binary division between the global North and the global South. 
Because of such disparities it is difficult to equitably distribute environmental benefits and 
burdens or even meaningfully involve all people in the implementation and enforcement of 
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environmental laws and policies. Even if one takes Lawson’s view that, “the persons 
responsible for wrongdoing have the greater responsibility for correcting it” (Lawson, 2008: 
3), it still remains difficult to arrive at an acceptable view of environmental justice. However, 
if environmental justice is understood as the equitable distribution of the benefits and burdens 
emanating from environmental and climate change as well as the involvement of all people in 
environmental policy implementation regardless of race, colour, origin, culture and education 
(Lawson, 2008: 1) in order to solve the current dramatic changes on the planet, an acceptable 
compromise or view of environmental justice is urgent. In this section, in order to arrive at a 
plausible view of environmental justice, I appeal to John Rawls’s two principles of justice that 
are assumed to be the only choices for all self interested rational beings behind the veil of 
ignorance (See Rawls, 1971: 52-3).     
First, a distributive approach to global environmental justice could be the starting point for the 
formulation of a plausible environmental justice framework that is acceptable to the global 
North and African communities. By this view, I argue that, all human being must strive to be, 
or revisit Rawls’ point of the original position (See Rawls, 1971: 15) in order for them to 
conceptualise an acceptable view of environmental ethical thinking embracing environmental 
justice for both the global South and the global North. Otherwise, it is difficult for human 
beings to come up with a uniform view of environmental justice if they are not on the same 
original position, and that their veil of ignorance is a rushed4 position like what is the case with 
contemporary clarion calls for global environmental justice (See Rawls, 1971: 101). My view 
is that, the quest for global environmental justice supposes an original position based on 
original freedom and equality among human beings and their communities. Yet this is not the 
case in most African countries with a history of slavery, colonialism, racism and apartheid. 
Because of this history and its effect in perpetuating inequalities between Africa and its 
counterparts in the North, environmental justice becomes a different and difficult proposition 
for Africa. 
In order that environmental justice makes meaning to the African condition, certain minimum 
standards of fairness and equality ought to be satisfied. Rawls articulates the need for satisfying 
these conditions for justice in the following perspective: 
                                                            
4 By rushed position, I mean that it is a position that is arrived at without first satisfying the conditions necessary 
for the attainment of fairness.   
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The intuitive idea of justice as fairness is to think of the first principles of justice 
as themselves the object of an original agreement in a suitably defined initial 
situation. These principles are those which rational persons concerned to advance 
their interests would accept in this position of equality to settle the basic terms of 
their association. It must be shown, then, that the two principles of justice are the 
solution for the problem of choice presented by the original position (Rawls, 1972: 
102). 
From this perspective, my contention is that the envisaged conditions for the original position 
in the contemporary world that is championing the quest for global environmental justice are 
not fully satisfied. For example, according to Rawls, one of the options for individuals in the 
original position is that they ought to choose from alternatives which are open to all persons in 
the original position. Similarly, although the quest for global environmental justice is urgent, 
there must be some way in which some alternatives are available for those in the global South 
economies.  
Also, the current clarion calls for global environmental justice are based on the understanding 
that all human beings are coming from a position of the veil of ignorance characterised by a 
hypothetical situation that insures impartiality in the quest for global environmental justice. 
The problem with the above view concerns what some of the alternatives to the global South 
entail? I argue that one way of trying to reach some compromise is to achieve distributive 
justice with regard to nature’s benefits and burdens by appealing to the first principle of justice 
developed by Rawls, namely the principle of equal liberty. According to Rawls, “each person 
is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with 
a similar scheme of liberties for others” (Rawls, 1971: 53). Following this first principle of 
equal liberty, all communities must be treated as having an equal right to the most extensive 
liberties, (which could be the environment and all its benefits and burdens) compatible with 
similar liberties of all other persons. Put into context, in order for environmental justice to make 
meaning to all persons, nature’s resources, benefits and burdens ought to be available in a way 
that is equitable and fair to everyone. 
However, this envisaged equality could be interpreted to mean similar interests, which is not 
the case between African communities and those in the North. In reality, there are inequalities 
and varied interests between the global North and the global South. Hence, the appeal to Rawls 
principle of equal liberty could possibly convince us to appreciate that levels of development 
that other economies have already reached need to be matched with those which have not 
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reached them. One way in which this could be achieved is to make sure that levels of 
greenhouse emissions between the global South and the global North should be fairly and 
equitably distributed as well5. Although this kind of compromise is difficult to settle for, it is 
mainly informed by Rawls’s thinking that “the most extreme disparities in wealth and income 
are allowed provided that they are necessary to raise the expectations of the least fortunate in 
the slightest degree” (Rawls, 1971: 136). Following a similar kind of thinking, Kelbessa 
proposes that “technological societies whose current emissions exceed their fair share of 
emissions ought to give attention to justice, and play their respective role in averting the most 
extreme effects” (Kelbessa, 2015: 42).     
From the above view, it is apparent that despite efforts to understand human beings as equal to 
each other, still, there are inequalities that persist amongst human beings. In this context, 
inequalities in terms of distribution of environmental benefits and burdens still exist between 
the global North and the global South. However, following Rawls’ second principle known as 
the ‘difference principle’, the other alternative could be to consider developing the economies 
of those in the global South so that they match those of their counterparts in the global North. 
Following Rawls’ second principle of difference, “social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) 
attached to positions and offices open to all” (Rawls, 1971: 53). According to this view, if 
environmental justice is to be achieved in a way that is fair to all, there is need to take into 
consideration the conditions of the least advantaged communities., i.e.: the communities in the 
greater part of Africa and the global South.  
Although I do not wish to get into the complex issues around African communitarianism, I also 
find it to be compatible with Rawls’s second principle of difference and its import to sound 
environmental justice because of its emphasis on the distribution of needs and interests for the 
good of the community, and not the individual. According to Gyekye, for example, “the notions 
of sharing one another’s fate, common assets, collective assets, common benefit, participating 
in one another’s nature --these notions and others related to them in Rawls’ scheme will surely 
find a more ready embrace in the communitarian home than in the home artificially and 
instrumentally constructed by individuals in pursuit of their own egoistic advantages or ends” 
(Gyekye, 1992: 118). Similarly, if the quest for global environmental justice is understood by 
                                                            
5 It must be emphasised that while this view is noble, the difficulty is how it can obtain among these non-
industrialised communities.  
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first appreciating these communitarian principles of justice together with the principles of 
equality and difference, it might be possible to settle for an acceptable view of environmental 
justice.  
Conclusion  
Arriving at an acceptable view of environmental justice involves addressing a lot of issues 
ranging from social, political and economic perspectives. Once some of these concerns are 
addressed, then it might be possible to equitably distribute environmental benefits and burdens 
as well as involve everyone in formulating and implementing sound environmental policies 
acceptable to all. I have attempted to highlight some of the central concerns that need to be 
addressed in order to formulate an acceptable global environmental justice paradigm. In the 
end, I argue for a framework for distributing environmental justice based on Rawls’ principles 
of equal liberty and the difference principle. Ultimately, I seek to conclude that these two 
principles of justice could be appealed to in order to equitably distribute environmental benefits 
and burdens acceptable to all.    
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